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ABSTRACT 
The Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI) F-16 program is investigating 
the integration of emerging technologies into an advanced fighter aircraft. The 
three major technologies involved are the (1) triplex digital flight control system; 
(2) decoupled aircraft flight control; and (3) integration of avionics, pilot dis- 
plays, and flight control. In addition to investigating improvements in fighter per- 
formance, the AFTI/F-16 program provides a look at generic problems facing highly 
integrated, flight-crucial digital controls. An overview of the AFTI/F-16 systems is 
followed by a summary of flight test experience and recommendations. 
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AFTI/F-16 
The Advanced Fighter Technology Integration, AFTI/F-16, is a joint Air Force, 
NASA, and Navy program. The Air Force's objective is the integration of emerging 
technologies into a single test bed fighter aircraft. The technologies include a 
triplex, dual fail/operate digital flight control system; decoupled flight control.; 
and integration of the cockpit functions, avionics, and flight control system. 
NASA’s primary goals for the program were to assure safety of flight of the vehicle 
and provide an independent assessment of these advanced technologies. The primary 
contractor is General Dynamics, Fort Worth, Texas. 
The AFTI/F-16 is a modified full-scale-development (FSD) F-16. Most of the 
changes were made to the on-board electronic systems, flight control, and avionics. 
However, two external modifications were made. Vertical canards were installed below 
the engine inlet to support decoupled aircraft control. A dorsal falring was added 
to house additional avionics and instrumentation. 
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AFTI'S INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGIES 
The digital flight control system is the heart of the technologies integrated 
into the APTI. In the area of fault tolerance, the dual fail/operate system provides 
dual fail/operate capability 95% of the time for computer CPU faults. Dual fail/ 
operate was a goal in addressing dual failures of sensors and discrete inputs for 
the APT1 program. The control law design includes mission-specific and decoupled-, 
control modes. The primary goal is to improve aircraft survivability in an attack. 
Another goal to reduce pilot workload is approached by integrating avionics and 
flight control functions with cockpit displays. One selection of a mission phase 
switch configures avionics, weapons, and flight control to a specific mode. The 
multipurpose displays allow for a centralized information display for all systems. 
These main technologies resulted in two spinoff technology goals for the flight 
control system, asynchronous computer operation, and a software-intensive design. 
Asynchronous operation is a major design characteristic which affects the dual fail/ 
operate capability, decoupled control law design, and the pilot's display of flight 
control status. The primary purpose of software-intensive design is to avoid addi- 
tional unique hardware in accomplishing the dual fail/operate requirement. 
Dual fail/operate 
with avionics 
Standard 81 decoupled 
Air-to-surface gun 
digital flight control system Software intensive design 
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RELIABILITY AND FAULT TOLERANCE 
Experience with the AFT1 F-16 digital flight control system has highlighted the 
relationship of fault tolerance and reliability. The software-intensive design of 
AFT1 for aircraft control and fault detection emphasizes the role software plays in 
overall system reliability. Hardware reliability, based on the replication of hard- 
ware components, has been the only contributor to system reliability numbers and loss 
of control probabilities. The reliability of the software and the functions, such as 
fault detection algorithms, designed in software must be considered in overall system 
reliability. 
Software reliability continues to be difficult to determine. Software reliabil- 
ity for AFT1 was accomplished through test and configuration control. Adequate soft- 
ware reliability was determined indirectly after confidence in system operation was 
achieved by successful completion of verification and validation testing. 
The relationship of fault tolerance to reliability comes through the software. 
The proper detection of hardware component failures by the software is essential to 
support the reliability figures for the hardware. If a single failure which caused 
loss of control went undetected, the reliability for the system would,be greatly 
reduced. Reliability is a function of the fault detection software. Here again, 
reliability is assured through the testing process. 
Total system reliability must consider the basic hardware architecture, the soft- 
ware testing process, and the fault detection algorithms which reside in the soft- 
ware. It is these last two considerations which will determine the validity of loss 
of control probabilities such as 1 X 10e7/hr. 
SYS 
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The AFT1 F-16 fault-tolerant design consists of two separate sets of checks to 
increase fault tolerance and provide the dual fail/operate capability. The first set 
of checks consists of selection and fault detection on input signals. The second set 
of checks selects values and provides fault detection on the computers and actuators. 
The purpose of the input signal selection and fault detection is to increase the 
system's ability to tolerate failures through cross-channel monitoring of the redun- 
dant hardware. Unique characteristics of the AFT1 design include: signal selection 
based on the failure status of higher level devices, such as the inverter; an aver- 
aging selection routine; a 15% failure threshold allowance; and reconfiguration of 
control laws for unresolved dual-sensor failure. 
Computer and actuator fault detection work together to provide the highest proba- 
bility for valid aircraft command in the face of single and multiple failures. The 
primary aspect is to accomplish the dual fail/operate capability centered on self- 
test computer coverage. The self-test feature is responsible for identifying the 
last good computing channel when only two channels remain and their commands are not 
tracking. A unique characteristic of the output selector and fault detection design 
is the choosing of one computer's command , with a 15% failure threshold allowance, to 
control the actuators. This design choice resulted from asynchronous computer opera- 
tion and interfacing constraints with the actuators. 
In-flight Fault Detection 
Serial digital data from lefl 
Serial digital data from right 
Input selection and fauft detection Output selection and fault detection 
Selection: Good signal average Selection: Use one channel’s value. 
Fault detection: Good signal comparison; 
tracking to 15% of full-scale failure 
threshold 
Reconfiguration: Loss of a sensor’s 
data causes reconfiguration of 
control laws or default to safe value 
Channel used is function of computer 
and hydraulic system failures 
Fauft detection: Good signal comparison; 
tracking to 15% failure threshold 
Reconfiguration: Computer self-test 
run for dual failures. 
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ASYNCHRONOUS COMPUTER OPERATION 
Although not intended to be a primary objective of the AFT1 program, the investi- 
gation of the asynchronous computer operation became a major activity. The asynchro- 
nous architectural concept started with the intent to increase EM1 immunity and over- 
all system fault tolerance. It was believed that concerns about asynchronous opera- 
tion (testability, data congruency, and nondeterministic operation) would be allevi- 
ated as the design matured. Considerable engineering effort went into designing and 
qualifying the DFCS with much being learned about asynchronous computer operation. 
Despite considerable effort and improvements in the qualification process, concerns 
for testability remained because anomalies related to asynchronous operation occurred 
in flight testing. Asynchronous operation, coupled with the complexities of 
decoupled control and dual fail/operate capability, resulted in an increased design 
task, extended qualification period, and marginal testability. After envelope expan- 
sion, flight test evaluation of the DFCS for mission performance did not identify any 
new anomalies related to asynchronous operation. 
Channel A 
Channel B 
Channel C 
1 Time 
Concept 
- Increase Immunity to EMIllightning 
- Increase computer channel independence 
- Increase fault tolerance over synchronized 
system 
Results 
Concerns 
- Random computer relationship, non. 
deterministic 
- Incongruent data sets due to sampling 
skew 
- Testability; assuring rellable operation for 
all conditions 
- Deslgn task complicated by asynchronism 
- Qualification time extended, repeatability 
poor 
- Complex interactions due to sampling 
skews 
- Flight test operatlons affected due to 
marginal testablllty 
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FLIGHT CONTROL 'MODE STRDCTURR 
'The ART1 digital flight control.system consists of eight flight control modes, 
four standard and four decoupled options. The four mission-specific categories i 
include normal, air-to-air gunnery, air-to-surface gunnery, and air-to-surface bomb 
modes. Mission-specific mode selection is accomplished through a mode panel or 
through hands-on selectors on the throttle. Mode selection configures both flight 
control and avionics. Decoupled mode options. are selected through a CCV lever on the 
right-hand side stick controller. Decoupled o&ions include pointing, translation, 
and direct force in both pitch and yaw axes. The decoupled options also include 
enhanced maneuvering modes utilizing the pitch stick. The decoupled air-toyair gun 
mode provides an adaptive mode for the pitch stick, changing control structure based 
on pitch rate errors. This allows for control optimization of gross acquisition and 
fine tracking in the air-to-air mission. 
In addition to the advanced decoupled modes, reconfiguration modes are included 
to provide dual fail/operate capability for sensor failure; however, there is a loss 
of decoupled and mission-specific modes. A reconfiguration mode is derived from the 
standard normal mode for dual failures of all primary feedback sensors, both longitu- 
dinal and lateral-directional. Reconfiguration modes use either synthesized sensor 
information or zero values as required. The digital system is backed up with an 
independent analog reversion mode. This provides protection for common mode errors 
which could cause loss of the digital system. 
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DECOUPLED CONTROL OPTIONS 
Decoupled control options consist of pointing, translation, and direct force for 
both pitch and yaw axes. Pitch axis modes use elevator and flap commands, and yaw 
axis modes use canards, rudder, differential elevator, and aileron commands. Point- 
ing allows for changing aircraft attitude without affecting flight path. Pointing 
angles are equivalent to changes in angle of attack and sideslip for each axis. 
Translation commands a constant velocity without affecting aircraft attitude. Angle 
of attack and sideslip vary with the command. The direct-force modes command accel- 
erations, affecting flight path, while keeping angle of attack and sideslip con- 
stant. The evaluation of decoupled options centered around weapon effectiveness 
while increasing aircraft survivability. 
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An example of the interactions which occurred between the redundancy management 
functions and control law is illustrated below. Triple analog input sensors are 
sampled asynchronously and compared within each computer. If the inputs are within 
an established trip level, the control laws in each computer use an average value for 
the triplex inputs. Because the system is asynchronous, the average value used by 
the control laws is slightly different in each computer. The complex control law 
structure, with its high gains, amplifies the difference in generating an output com- 
mand. The output command is monitored by each computer to assure that the differen- 
ces between output commands are within a given difference (that is, trip level). The 
amplified differences generated by the high-gain control law function cause nuisance 
failures in the output command monitor. If three output surface commands fail within 
one computer, a channel is failed. This was particularly evident in the advanced and 
decoupled modes during ground qualification. The control gains were reduced to pre- 
vent nuisance failures as a consequence of the redundancy management/control law 
interactions. 
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stick 
Triplex 
outpd 
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stick 
Sampled stick 
Input to computers 
Time 
Selected stick 
Inputs for each 
Tlme 
Stick 
output 
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output 
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Control law gain 
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magnlfled failures 
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The digital flight control software design and test activities are summarized as 
a top-down design with bottom-up testing. The design, test, and redesign cycle is 
accomplished through a configuration control/ discrepancy reporting process. Top- 
down design began with a function breakdown based on the design specification. The 
functional breakdown was carried directly into a structured software design. The 
lowest breakdown of the software is termed a unit and is required to have one exit 
and entry point and be less than 100 lines of code. Strict documentation, com- 
menting, and software design reviews were essential to the software design process. 
Software testing took a bottom-up approach, beginning with unit testing. The 
module and the component testing were accomplished as the necessary units were 
integrated. Testing to this level is done by the software design team, with a 
final integrated software package going to an independent test group. The indepen- 
dent test group performed verification (proper software implementation of the 
functions) and validation (proper system level operation testing of the flight 
control system). Detailed specification and design documents were used by the test 
team to assure proper testing of all flight control functions. Details of the. 
qualification can be found in references 1, 2, and 3. 
The configuration control process provided the means to document discrepancies 
found in test and to correct the discrepancies in the software or hardware as needed. 
The key to the process is a systems-wide approach covering control laws, fault tol- 
erances, avionics, hardware, and software. Interdisciplinary knowledge and resolu- 
tion of problems are essential in such heavily integrated systems. 
Top-down design 
I Specification I 
J 
Functional breakdown 
J 
Computer components 
(highest software function) 
s 
Modules 
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FLIGHT TEST RESULTS: GENERAL 
Flight testing of the AFT1 F-16 was successfully accomplished over a 13-month 
period in 1982 and 1983. A total of 118 flights were flown by pilots from four 
organizations: Air Force, NASA, Navy, and General Dynamics. All major objectives 
were completed, including envelope expansion for high angles of attack and Mach num- 
bers up to 1.2, combat mission evaluations of decoupled control, and structural load 
clearance for the decoupled motions. Low flight rates early in the program were due 
to anomalies of the basic aircraft as well as to the AFT1 unique systems. 
Thirteen software releases were made during flight test to the digital flight 
control system. Software changes were made to correct discrepancies and provide 
improvements in flying qualities, fault-tolerant operation, and structural-load-limit 
items. An efficient software change process is required to provide safe, timely 
changes needed to accomplish flight test objectives. 
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l 118 total fliahts by Air Force, NASA, Navy, and General 
Dynamics alots 
l Thirteen releases of flight control software 
l Full envelope expansion of three separate flight 
control modes 
l Air-to-air and air-to-ground mission evaluations of 
decoupled control options 
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Built-in test (BIT) is a highly automated test sequence that assures the digital 
flight control system (DFCS) is free of hardware failures prior to takeoff. BIT is 
run prior to each flight and takes approximately 2.5 min. Two failures of the hard- 
ware were detected by BIT during flight testing. The first was a failure of the flap 
actuator, the second involved memory chips which didn't meet timing specifications at 
cooler temperatures. Nuisance failures of BIT occurred a number of times. The cause 
is believed to be EMI. 
In-flight fault detection is accomplished by comparing the three values for 
tracking among the different channels. The only real failure was an input signal 
which was traced to a pushed-back pin in the aircraft wiring. The 15 false failures 
were due to design deficiencies rather than actual hardware failures. The design 
deficiencies, which resulted in both temporary (resettable) and permanent loss of 
flight control redundancy , were corrected in subsequent software releases. 
The asynchronous computer architecture affected a wide range of developmental 
activities including design, software/system qualification, and flight test opera- 
tions. Initially DFCS qualification was not full proof because of the dependence of 
failure modes on computer skew. Testing at predetermined "worst case" computer skew 
improved testing results; however, some deficiencies still escaped detection. Ground 
operations during aircraft preflight were impacted by the asynchronous computer 
architecture. The most common problem resulted in DFCS failures, requiring reset by 
pilot or cycling of aircraft electrical power. 
The false failures, not hardware induced, were the result of the design deficien- 
cies associated with asynchronous computer operation. The design deficiencies 
resulted from the coupling of unique computer skews with characteristics of the 
flight environment, such as sensor noise. Undetected during qualification, these in- 
flight failures resulted in envelope and flight control mode limitations until they 
were corrected by software changes. 
The software configuration control process details the procedures equivalent to 
the maintenance procedures for hardware, but in the software environment. Maintain- 
ing safe, operational software requires specification, design, test, and documenta- 
tion for every change. Software change, specification, and time line for incorpora- 
tion directly involved flight test planning. Testing and documentation provide 
details for operating characteristics and/or restrictions. 
The 13 flight test software releases, in which design, coding, and test of the 
changes were performed at General Dynamics, Fort Worth, supported the needed changes 
for flight test. The first four releases provided full envelope capability for the 
AFT1 vehicle in all flight control modes. The remaining nine releases modified the 
control system's control laws to improve flying qualities and the fault-detection 
function to improve reliability. 
Software errors are software design or coding errors which escaped detection by 
the software verification and system validation testing. Two of the errors resulted 
from a loosening of the detailed established procedures. The third error was caused 
by a coding error involved in the correction of a previous false in-flight failure 
condition. The error was found when the in-flight failure condition recurred. It 
was found that the configuration control process provided excellent software opera- 
tion in the face of constant change. The testing and documentation process, when 
strictly followed, will detect software design and coding errors. 
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Flight Test Results: Fault-Tolerant Design 
And Software Maintainability 
Fault tolerance Software maintenance 
l Built-in test l Software configuration control process 
- Comprehensive, automated P-min - Details configuration/operating 
preflight check restrictions 
- Some nuisance failures due to EMI - Provides specification, design, test and 
l In-flight fault detection 
documentation process 
- Interfaces to flight test planning 
- Fifteen false failures detected 
- Three failures, cause not known l Software changes, always 
- One real failure detected - 129 total changes in 13 separate 
l Asynchronous computer operation, problems 
releases 
- Changes to both fault-tolerantlcontrol- 
- Adversely affected DFCS qualification law designs 
- Accomplice to in-flight failures 
l Software errors occurred 
- Three errors found in flight releases 
- Process keeps serious errors from 
affecting flighj operations 
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FLIGHT TEST RESULTS: CONTROL LAWS 
A primary objective of the AFTI F-16 program was the evaluation of a multimode 
digital flight control system with decoupled aircraft control. The six different 
decoupled options and right-hand control options were evaluated with the decoupled 
feature best suited for a given task identified. 
The adaptive control law, which uses pitch rate error to optimize performance in 
gross acquisition and fine tracking , was shown to be the best option for the air-to- 
air combat task. The adaptive gain control law was implemented using the right-hand 
controller; decoupled pointing with the pedals and twist grip showed no significant 
improvement for the air-to-air task. 
The best feature for the air-to-ground task was again through the pitch stick 
with improved flight path stability and ride smoothness in turbulence. Direct side 
force or flat turn which is commanded through the rudder pedals improved the task by 
reducing pilot workload for obtaining lateral axis solutions. Problems with roll 
ratcheting affected all the advanced combat modes. Prefilter tuning was not suf- 
ficient to completely resolve the problem. 
The standard normal mode, configured for gear-down, provided a greatly improved 
mode for power approach. Using more of a pitch-rate command system versus the nor- 
mal acceleration command system on the F-16's, improvements in flight path and angle- 
of-attack stability were made. 
The need for and design of the analog reversion mode to protect against common 
mode failures proved most interesting. Although the analog reversion mode (ARM) was 
never engaged because of digital system failure, flight test experience indicates 
ARMS are needed. Complexity of the ARM becomes a primary issue; a simple ARM cannot 
provide protection at envelope extremes which are possible with the digital systems. 
Furthermore, the relaxed static characteristic requires a certain level of augmen- 
tation. The simplified reversion mode used on AFT1 provided get-home capability and 
level 2 flying qualities for landing as specified. However, simulation and flight 
test indicated a more capable ARM is needed to cover transitions from the envelope 
extremes possible with the digital control system (ref. 4). 
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Flight Test Results: Control Laws 
l Air-to-air combat task 
- Longitudinal axis pitch stick control excellent based on adaptive, 
pitch rate error, gain system 
- Decoupled pointing showed no significant improvements for 
task completion 
l Airtoground task 
- Longitudinal axis pitch stick control improved, better 
flight path stability/ride quality 
- Flat turn, direct side force useful, simplified task, 
reduced pilot workioad 
- Roll ratcheting problem in all combat modes 
l Power-approach task 
- Longitudinal axis control improvement over F-16, better 
flight path/angle-of-attack stability, precise attitude 
control 
l Analog reversion mode 
- No automatic engagement of mode 
- Design of mode too simplified, reduced failure 
envelope, compromised flying qualities 
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FLIGHT TEST RESULTS: SUMMARY 
Successful flight test accomplishments included envelope expansion for the pri- 
mary flight control modes for stability and control and for structural loads. 
Envelope expansion included testing for low-speed, high-angle-of-attack, and high- 
speed-to-Mach-l.2 conditions. Evaluation of the advanced control modes, the final 
goal, was accomplished in the last 15 flights. 
Advanced control options were evaluated in a variety of air-to-air and air-to- 
surface combat tasks. Advanced flight control modes for the right-hand controller 
gave the best performance of the decoupled control options; flat turn showed signifi- 
cant improvements over conventional control methods. 
The asynchronous computer architecture proved to be one of the most interesting 
aspects of AFTI/F-16 because of its wide-ranging effects. The fact that a given 
architectural design feature can affect design, qualification, and flight test is 
noteworthy. Flight test was culminated with no fault-tolerant-type anomalies 
affecting flight test operations. 
Representing a state-of-the-art, flight-crucial, highly integrated control 
system, AFT1 provided the opportunity to find weaknesses in the developmental process 
resulting from the new technologies. Design and testing tools to support the devel- 
opment of increasing complex systems need to be developed. The goal is to develop 
tools which can support a generic set of digital control applications. Tools that 
assist in the design and testing of the fault-tolerant and software aspects of new 
highly integrated systems would prove beneficial. 
l Successful accomplishment of flight test goals 
l Advanced control options improve aircraft 
performance 
l Asynchronous computer architecture gave 
difficulties, costly 
l Flight-crucial controls/integrated systems stress 
developmental process 
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FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
The AFT1 F-16 program provided the engineering community another look at the 
development of a highly integrated flight-crucial system. Considerable knowledge was 
gained in the development and flight test of decoupled aircraft control, asynchronous 
computer operation, and flight-crucial software. As the dust settles and the results 
are reviewed, several areas for further consideration surface. 
The time for a fault-tolerant system design tool has come. As any new technology 
begins to succeed and grow, design tools are needed to increase engineering produc- 
tivity and provide better, safer product designs. Information exists to develop a 
design tool which documents fault-tolerant designs and allows for systematic test 
approaches that can increase operational reliability. The tool would allow for early 
integration of the fault-tolerant design with the control law functions to avoid 
costly downstream changes. The design tool would essentially be an expert system 
which would help guide the engineer in the specification, design, and qualification 
of a fault-tolerant design. 
The development and the use of software and system-level testing tools also need 
to be applied to the development of flight-crucial controls. By increasing test 
coverage, automating the testing process, and providing integral configuration 
control, operational reliability and development time could both be improved. 
Further consideration is also being given to the primary AFT1 technologies. The 
use of AFT1 flight control laws in an automated-flight fire control system is one 
example. Increasing weapon delivery accuracy while increasing aircraft survivability 
will be a primary emphasis of AFTI's second phase, Automated Maneuvering Attack 
System (AMAS). 
l Faulttolerant design tool 
- Design documentation 
- Systematic testing capability 
- Integration of control functions 
- Architectural studies 
- Expert system 
l Software/system testing tools 
- Increase/measure test coverage 
- Automate testing process 
- Provide configuration control 
l Decoupled control in automated attack 
l Increase survivability 
l Weapon accuracy 
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